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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court of Utah has jurisdiction over this
appeal by virtue of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) .
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred in concluding that

Plaintiff Ed Ingram (hereinafter Mr. Ingram) made an
election of remedies to pursue his breach of contract claim
under Count One of his Amended Complaint, which precluded
him from recovering statutory damages under Count Four.

A

trial court's conclusions of law are reviewable for
correctness.
Blomquist,

Ron Case

Roofing

& Asphalt

Paving,

773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989).

Inc.

v.

This issue was

preserved in Plaintiff's Reply in Support of Motion for
Entry of Judgment.
2.

(R. 0316-0323)

Whether the trial court erred in concluding that

Mr. Ingram's entitlement to recover compensatory damages
under Count One of his Amended Complaint qualifies as
"payment made prior to Entry of Judgment" under section
11.(b) of the Settlement Agreement entered into by the
parties, which precludes Mr. Ingram from recovering
compensatory damages under Count Four., A trial court's
conclusions of law are reviewable for correctness.

1

Ron

Case

Roofing

& Asphalt

1385 (Utah 1989).

Paving,

Inc.

v. Blomquist,

773 P. 2d 1382,

Contract interpretation is a question of

law reviewed without deference to the trial court.
Cas.
575.

Co. v.

Able

Constr.,

Inc.,

Nova

1999 UT 69, 16, 983 P.2d

This issue was preserved in Plaintiff's Memorandum in

Support of Motion for Entry of Judgment.

(R. 0280-0290)

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a final order of the Third

Judicial District Court of Summit County.
II.

Statement of Facts
1.

Mr. Ingram's Amended Complaint asserts four claims

for relief: (a) Count One asserts a claim for breach of
contract against Defendant Brian Kitts (hereinafter Mr.
Kitts) in the amount of $54,790.04 based upon Mr. Kitts'
failure to pay for labor and material supplied by Mr. Ingram
for the improvement of Mr. Kitts' residence; (b) Count Two
asserts a claim for lien foreclosure in accordance with Utah
Code Ann. § 38-1-7; (c) Count Three asserts a claim against
Mr. Kitts for lost profits in the amount of $18,015.00; and
2

Count Four asserts a claim against both Mr. Kitts and
Defendant Sunpeak Holdings, Inc. (hereinafter Sunpeak) under
Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-1 based upon two checks which Mr.
Kitts issued to Mr. Ingram which were returned to Mr. Ingram
stamped "NSF."

The damages prayed for in Count Four include

the face amount of the NSF checks ($5,840.00 and $13,405.07,
respectively), returned check charges in the amount of
$40.00, reasonable attorney fees, and statutory damages in
the amount of $20,245.07 in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §
7-15-1. (R. 0050-0063)
2.

Both of the NSF checks at issue in Count Four of

the Amended Complaint were delivered to Mr. Ingram as
partial payment for the labor performed and material
supplied for which Mr. Ingram also seeks to recover
compensatory damages in Count One. (R. 0372)
3.

A bench trial was scheduled in this action for

February 19, 2003.
4.

(R. 0267)

On February 18, 2003, the day before trial, Mr.

Ingram entered into a Settlement, Release and Indemnity
Agreement (hereinafter the "Settlement Agreement") with Mr.
Kitts and Sunpeak, pursuant to which Mr. Kitts and Sunpeak
promised to pay Mr. Ingram the sum of $68,757.26 on or

3

before March 19, 2003. (R. 0283-288)
5.

Paragraph 11.b. of the Settlement Agreement

provides that "[i]n the event Kitts and Sunpeak fail to pay
Ingram the Settlement Amount as agreed in Section 11.a.
herein, Ingram shall be entitled to judgment against Kitts
and Sunpeak as prayed for in the Amended Complaint, less
sums paid by Kitts and Sunpeak to the date of entry of
judgment." (R. 0284-0285)
6.

Mr. Kitts and Sunpeak failed to make the required

payment. (R. 0280)
7.

Accordingly, on April 17, 2003, Mr. Ingram filed a

Motion for Entry of Judgment in which he requested that
judgment be entered against Mr. Kitts and Sunpeak as prayed
for under the four Counts of his Amended Complaint in
accordance with Section 11.b. of the Settlement Agreement.
(R. 0279-0290)
8.

Mr. Kitts and Sunpeak filed a Memorandum in

Opposition to Motion for Entry of Judgment on April 29,
2003.

In their memorandum, Defendants argued, inter alia,

that:
(a) Mr. Ingram was not entitled to recover both
compensatory damages under Count One and also statutory

4

damages under Count Four of the Amended Complaint.
According to Defendants, recovery of both compensatory
damages and statutory damages would amount to a double
recovery and, therefore, that Mr. Ingram should be
required to elect his remedy under either Count One or
Count Four.
(b) Mr. Ingram's entitlement to judgment for
compensatory damages under Count One of the Amended
Complaint qualifies as "sums paid by Kitts and Sunpeak
to the date of entry of judgment" within the meaning of
paragraph 11.b. of the Settlement Agreement, thereby
precluding an award of compensatory damages under Count
Four of the Amended Complaint.
(R. 0294-0309)
9.

Mr. Ingram filed a Reply in Support of Motion for

Entry of Judgment in which he argued that not only does the
Settlement Agreement specifically provide for the entry of
judgment "as prayed for in the Amended Complaint," but UCA §
7-15-1 specifically provides for recovery of both
compensatory and statutory damages.

Mr. Ingram also pointed

out that there is no double recovery because the
compensatory damages which he is entitled to recover under

5

Count Four have been subtracted from those which he is
entitled to recover under Count One.
10.

(R. 0316-0323)

Following a hearing held May 28, 2003, the trial

court sustained Defendants' objection and denied Mr. Ingram
recovery of statutory damages under Count Four.

(R. 0327-

0328)
11.

An Order sustaining Mr. Kitts' objection (R. 0371-

0377) and a Judgment in favor of Mr. Ingram (R. 0378-0380)
were both entered on June 30, 2003.

On that same date, the

trial court also issued a Rule 54 Certification certifying
both the Judgment and the Order as final in accordance with
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

(R. 0381-

0382)
12.

Mr. Ingram timely filed his Notice of Appeal on

July 18, 2003.

(R. 0401-0402)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Mr. Ingram was not required to elect his remedies
because he does not seek a double recovery.
Resource

v.

Gibralter

Fin.

Corp.,

See

Royal

603 P.2d 793, 796 (Utah

1979)("[t]he doctrine of election of remedies is a technical
rule of procedure and its purpose is not to prevent recourse
to any remedy, but to prevent double redress for a single

6

wrong").

Pursuant to the parties' Settlement Agreement, Mr.

Ingram was entitled to the entry of judgment "as prayed for
in the Amended Complaint..."

(R. 0284)

Count One of the

Amended Complaint seeks compensatory damages of $54,790.04.
Count Four seeks compensatory damages of $19,245.07 and
statutory damages in the amount of $20,245.07 in accordance
with § 7-15-1, U.C.A.

If Mr. Ingram was asking for both the

full amount of compensatory damages prayed for in Count One
($54,790.04) and the full amount of compensatory damages
prayed for in Count Four ($19,245.07) that might1 amount to
a double recovery to the extent of $19,245.07.

However, Mr.

Ingram is only asking for $29,704.97 in compensatory damages
under Count One and $19,245.07 in compensatory damages under
Count Four totaling $48,950.04.

Thus, there is no double

recovery because Mr. Ingram has subtracted the compensatory
damages which he is entitled to recover under Count Four
from those which he is entitled to recover under Count One.
Also erroneous is the trial court's conclusion that Mr.
Ingram's entitlement to recover compensatory damages under
Count One qualifies as "payment made prior to Entry of

x

25 Am Jur 2d § 18, p. 779 ("If the remedies are
alternative and concurrent, there is no bar until
satisfaction has been obtained").
7

Judgment" under section 11.b. of the Settlement Agreement,
which precludes Mr. Ingram from recovering compensatory
damages under Count Four.

Neither Mr. Kitts nor Sunpeak has

ever made any payment to Mr. Ingram in accordance with the
Settlement Agreement either before or after the entry of
Judgment.
ARGUMENT
I.

MR. INGRAM WAS NOT REQUIRED TO ELECT HIS REMEDY BECAUSE
HE DOES NOT SEEK A DOUBLE RECOVERY.
The trial court ruled that Mr. Ingram is precluded from

recovering both compensatory damages under Count One of the
Amended Complaint and statutory damages under Count Four
because to do so would amount to a "double recovery."
is clearly not the case.

That

The Settlement Agreement entered

into by the parties provides that Mr. Ingram is entitled to
judgment against Mr. Kitts "as prayed for in the Amended
Complaint."

(R. 0284)

Count One of the Amended Complaint

seeks compensatory damages of $54,790.04.

Count Four seeks

compensatory damages of $19,245.07 and statutory damages in
the amount of $20,245.072 in accordance with § 7-15-1,
U.C.A.

If Mr. Ingram was asking for both the full amount of

2

Count Four also seeks returned check fees of $40.00,
interest, and attorney fees.
8

compensatory damages prayed for in Count One ($54,7 90.04)
and the full amount of compensatory damages prayed for in
Count Four ($19,245.07) that might amount to a double
recovery to the extent of $19,245.07.

However, Mr. Ingram

is only asking for $29,704.973 in compensatory damages under
Count One and $19,245.07 under Count Four totaling
$48,950.04.
In short, there is no double recovery because Mr.
Ingram has subtracted the compensatory damages which he is
entitled to recover under Count Four from those which he is
entitled to recover under Count One.

Accordingly, the

doctrine of election of remedies is not applicable to this

case.

See Royal

Resource

v. Gibralter

Fin.

Corp.,

603 P.2d

793, 796 (Utah 1979) ("[tjhe doctrine of election of remedies
is a technical rule of procedure and its purpose is not to
prevent recourse to any remedy, but to prevent double
redress for a single wrong"); Brigham
Center,
Interstate

City

Sand

v.

613 P.2d 510 (Utah 1980)(same); and Angelos
Bank

also, 25 Am Jur

of

Utah,

Machinery
v.

First

671 P.2d 772 (Utah 1983)(same); see

2d § 18, p. 779 ("The doctrine of election

of remedies does not apply if the available remedies are
3

$54,790.04 minus $5,840 (previously paid by Mr. Kitts to
Mr. Ingram) minus $19,245.07 equals $29,704.97.
9

consistent and concurrent or cumulative.

If the remedies

are alternative and concurrent, there is no bar until
satisfaction has been obtained").
Finally, § 7-15-1 specifically provides that, in
addition to compensatory damages, a successful plaintiff is
entitled to recover statutory damages:
(A) equal to the greater of:
(I) $100.00;
or (II) triple the check amount; and
(B) not to exceed the check amount plus $500.
U.C.A. § 7-15-1(7)(b)(vi).
Accordingly, Mr. Ingram is entitled to recover
compensatory damages in the amount of $29,704.97 under Count
One of his Amended Complaint, as well as both compensatory
damages in the amount of $19,245.07 and statutory damages in
the amount of $20,245.07 under Count Four of his Amended
Complaint.
II.

A JUDGMENT AWARDING DAMAGES IS NOT THE SAME AS
RECEIPT OF "PAYMENT."
The trial court also concluded that Mr. Ingram's

entitlement to recover compensatory damages under Count One
qualifies as "payment made prior to Entry of Judgment" under
section 11.b. of the Settlement Agreement, which precludes
Mr. Ingram from recovering compensatory damages under Count

10

Four.

Mr. Ingram respectfully submits that this conclusion

is clearly false.

Section 11.b. of the Settlement Agreement

was obviously intended to provide Defendants with credit for
any payment which they made to Mr. Ingram toward the
settlement amount of $68,727.56.

Defendants, however, have

never paid any of the $68,757.26 which they agreed to pay
under the Settlement Agreement and an award of damages is no
closer to "payment" than a bird in the bush is to one in the
hand.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Ingram respectfully
requests that the trial court's June 30, 2003 Order be
reversed to the extent that it denies Mr. Ingram judgment in
accordance with Count Four of the Amended Complaint and that
this action be remanded to the trial court with instructions
for the entry of judgment in Mr. Ingram's favor for
statutory damages in the amount of $20,245.07, returned
check fees of $40.00, interest, and attorney fees incurred
both before the trial court and in connection with this
appeal.

11

DATED this

27

day of April 2004

>rney for Appellant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
Undersigned certifies that two copies of the foregoing
were mailed this y^/JPM-ay of April 2004 via first class U.S
Mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
E. Paul Wood
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Darren K. Nelson
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
185 S. State, Suite 1300
P.O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
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Addendum
1

E.PAUL WOOD-3537
Attorney for Kitts
and Sunpeak Holdings, Inc.
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435
Facsimile: (801) 575-7834
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ED INGRAM dba ED INGRAM
CONSTRUCTION,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

j

vs.
BRIAN KITS; SUNPEAK HOLDINGS,
INC.; WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK
fsb ABC Corporation I-V; XYZ Partnerships
I-V; and John Does I-V;

Case No.: 010500400 LM
Judge: Bruce Lubeck

Defendants.

Plaintiffs Motion for Entry of Judgment and Defendants5 Objections thereto came on for
hearing before the Honorable Bruce Lubeck, Third District Court Judge presiding on Tuesday,
May 28, 2003 at the hour of 9:00 o'clock am. Scott B. Mitchell appeared on behalf of Plaintiff.
E. Paul Wood appeared on behalf of Defendants Brian Kitts and Sunpeak Holdings, Inc. Dairen
K. Nelson appeared on behalf of Defendant Washington Mutual Bank. The Court, having

considered the Memoranda submitted by the parties, the pleadings on file with the Court, and the
arguments of counsel, herewith enters its Findings and Conclusions as follows:
1.

Plaintiff Ed Ingram filed an Amended Complaint stating four claims for relief:
Count I alleges breach of contract based upon Defendants' failure to pay for labor
performed and materials supplied on the improvement of the Defendant's real
property having a reasonable value of Fifty Four Thousand Seven Hundred Ninety
Dollars and 04/100ths ($54,790.04); Count II, requests foreclosure of a mechanics
lien; Count III requests payment of fifteen percent (15%) profit of the
compensatory damages alleged in Count I in an amount equal to Eighteen
Thousand Fifteen Dollars ($18,015.00); and Count IV, requests statutory damages
under Section 7-15-1 Utah Code Ami, for two insufficient funds checks drawn on
the account of Defendants, check no. 181 in the amount of Thirteen Thousand Four
Hundred Five Dollars and 07/100ths ($13,405.07) which, by its terms, is payable
for "Lumber and Permit" and check no. 182 in the amount of Five Thousand Eight
Hundred Forty Dollars ($5,840.00), payableby its temis for "Deposit Windows and
Tile" ("the Checks").

2/

The Checks were written for labor performed and material supplied for which
Ingram seeks recovery of compensatory damages under Count I.

2

Ingram and Defendants Kitts and Sunpeak Holdings, Inc. entered a Settlement
Agreement whereby Kitts and Sunpeak Holdings, Inc. agreed to pay Sixty Eight
Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Seven Dollars and 26/100ths ($68,757.26) on or
before March 19,2003.
Paragraph 11 .(b) of the Settlement Agreement sets forth the remedy for the failure
to pay:
"Ingram shall be entitled to Judgment against Kitts and Sunpeak
as prayed for in the Amended Complaint, less sums paid by
Kitts and Sunpeak to the date of Entry of Judgment."
Kitts and Sunpeak failed to pay the agreed upon settlement amount by the stated
date.
Ingram filed a Motion forEntry of Judgment seeking payment under all four claims
set forth in the Amended Complaint.
Defendants Kitts and Sunpeak Holdings, Inc. opposed Entry of Judgment for
statutory damages under Count IV on the following theory:
a.

Plaintiffs Count 1 for breach of contract includes compensatory damages
for labor and materials for which Kitts/Sunpeak Holdings, Inc. wrote the
Checks which failed to clear the bank. Section 7-15-1 Utah Code Ann,
requires recovery of compensatory damages for the face amount of the
Check as a condition of awarding statutory damages. Plaintiff Ingram
3

elected the remedy of pursuing Judgment for compensatory damages under
Count I in the amount of Fifty Four Thousand Seven Hundred Ninety
Dollars and 04/] OOths ($54,790.04) which would preclude recovering of
compensatory damages under Count IV for the insufficient funds Checks.
Under the legal principle of election of remedies, Ingram is precluded from
recovering statutory damages under Section 7-15-1 Utah Code Ann.
b.

The language of the Settlement Agreement allows Entry of Judgment
against Kitts and Sunpeak "less sums paid by Kitts and Sunpeak to date of
Entry of Judgment." Ingram will recover compensatory damages for labor
performed and materials supplied under Count I of the Amended Complaint
which qualifies as "sums paid by Kitts and Sunpeak to the date of Entry of
Judgment" and prohibit also awarding compensatory damages under Count
IV for the insufficient funds Checks.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff Ingram elected to pursue and recover
compensatory damages for labor performed and materials supplied under a theory
of breach of contract set forth in Count I seeking compensatory damages in the
amount of Fifty Four Thousand Seven Hundred Ninety Dollars and 04/1 OOths
($54,790.04).
4

The Checks were written by Kitts and Sunpeak Holdings, Inc. for materials which
were part of the materials for which Ingram seeks compensatory damages under
Count!
Pursuant to Section 7-15-1 Utah Code Ann, under Count IV, Ingram, must be
awarded compensatory damages for the face amount of the Checks in order to be
awarded statutory damages.
Ingi'am made an election of remedies to pursue the breach of contract theory under
Count I for which Ingram will recover compensatory damages in the amount of
Fifty Four Thousand Seven Hundred Ninety Dollars and 04/100ths ($54,790.04),
which includes the face amount of the Checks. As a result, Ingram is not entitled
to recover under Count IV on his claim for statutory damages for the insufficient
funds Checks.
Additionally, Ingram's recovery of compensatory damages under Count I for labor
performed and materials supplied is "payment made prior to Entry of Judgement"
by Kitts and Sunpeak Holdings, Inc. under section 11.(b) of the Settlement
Agreement which precludes recovery of compensatory damages under Count IV
relating to Section 7-15-1 Utah Code Ann, for compensatory damages for the face
value of the Checks.

5

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

Defendant's objection to Entry of Judgment is sustained.

2.

Recovery under Plaintiffs Count IV of the Amended Complaint is denied.

3.

Plaintiffs counsel is directed to revise the proposed Judgment consistent with the
terms hereof and submit the same for approval.

DATED this Qfc> day of June, 2003.

By the Court:

hi

Bruce Lubeck
District Court Judge

Approved as to form:

Sobtt B. Mitchell, Esq.
Ahopney for Ed Ingram

By: Darren K. Nelson, Esq.
Attorneys for Washington Mutual Bank
6

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1 hereby certify that on t h i s / / C 3ay of June, 2003,1 caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER to be mailed, first class to the following:
Scott Mitchell, Esq.
2469 East 7000 South, Suite 204
Salt Lake City, UT 84121

Darren K. Nelson, Esq.
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, UT 8411 \J-
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Addendum
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FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

7-14-1

blacklist, or otherwise be a basis for liability to any person on
the part of any participant in the reciprocal exchange of
information authorized by this chapter.
issi

CHAPTER 14
CREDIT INFORMATION EXCHANGE
Section
7-14-1.
7-14-2.
7-14-3.
7-14-4.
7-14-5.

Definitions.
Legislative findings.
Information an institution may furnish.
Immunity from liability.
Reciprocal exchange of information authorized.

7-14-1. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Depository institution" means any institution authorized by state or federal law to accept and hold demand
deposits or other accounts which may be used to effect
third party payment transactions. The definition of "depository institution" in Chapter 1 does not apply to
Chapter 14.
(2) "Credit reporting agency" includes any co-operative
credit reporting agency maintained by an association of
financial institutions or one or more associations of merchants.
1995
7-14-2. L e g i s l a t i v e findings.
The substantial financial loss to the state and to trade and
commerce within this state resulting from the dishonor or
other return of checks, drafts, or other orders for the payment
of money, including transactions to be consummated by electronic means, requires concerted effort by financial institutions to attempt to minimize the number of such occurrences.
The Legislature finds t h a t to facilitate such concerted effort
adequate protection against liability of the participating financial institutions is necessary.
1981
7-14-3. Information a n i n s t i t u t i o n m a y furnish.
Any institution doing business in the state may report to
any other financial institution, or credit reporting agency the
following:
(1) that an account maintained to effect third party
payment transactions has been closed out by the institution, the reasons therefor, and the identity of the depositor
or account holder;
(2) upon the request of another financial institution
any other information in the files of the institution relating to the credit experience of the reporting institution
with respect to a particular person as to whom inquiry is
made; and
(3) any information concerning attempted or potential
activity to defraud a financial institution or to obtain
funds from a financial institution by fraudulent or other
unlawful means or other information relating to individuals sought by law enforcement authorities for alleged
violations of criminal laws.
1981
7-14-4. I m m u n i t y from liability.
No depository institution making any report or communication of information authorized by this chapter shall be liable to
any person for disclosing such information to any recipient
authorized to receive this information under this chapter, or
for any error or omission in such report or communication.
1981

7-14-5.

188

Reciprocal e x c h a n g e of information authorized.
One or more financial institutions may jointly agree with
one or more other financial institutions for the reciprocal
exchange of any information authorized to be reported by the
provisions of this chapter. Such reciprocal exchange of information or the acts or refusals to act of one or more recipients
because of such information shall not constitute a boycott or

CHAPTER 15
DISHONORED INSTRUMENTS
Section
7-15-1.
7-15-2.
7-15-3.

7-15-1.

Definitions — Civil liability of issuer — Notice of
action — Collection costs — Exemptions.
Notice — Form.
Liability of financial institution upon wrongful dishonor.

Definitions — Civil liability of issuer — Notice
of action — Collection costs — E x e m p t i o n s .
(1) As used in this chapter:
(a) "Check" means a payment instrument on a depository institution including a:
(i) check;
(ii) draft;
(iii) order; or
(iv) other instrument.
(b) "Issuer" means a person who makes, draws, signs,
or issues a check, whether as corporate agent or otherwise, for the purpose of:
(i) obtaining from any person any money, merchandise, property, or other thing of value; or
(ii) paying for any service, wages, salary, or rent.
(c) "Mailed" means the day that a notice is properly
deposited in the United States mail.
(2) (a) An issuer of a check is liable to the holder of the
check if:
(i) the check:
(A) is not honored upon presentment; and
(B) is marked "refer to maker";
(ii) the account upon which the check is made or
drawn:
(A) does not exist;
(B) has been closed; or
(C) does not have sufficient funds or sufficient
credit for payment in full of the check; or
(iii) (A) the check is issued in partial or complete
fulfillment of a valid and legally binding obligation; and
(B) the issuer stops payment on the check
with the intent to:
(I) fraudulently defeat a possessory lien;
or
(II) otherwise defraud the holder of the
check.
(b) If an issuer of a check is liable under Subsection
(2)(a), the issuer is liable for:
(i) the check amount; and
(ii) a service charge of $20.
(3) (a) The holder of a check that has been dishonored may:
(i) give written or oral notice of dishonor to the
issuer of the check; and
(ii) waive all or part of the service charge imposed
under Subsection (2Kb).
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(b), a holder of a
check that has been dishonored may not collect and the
issuer is not liable for the service charge imposed under
Subsection (2Kb) if:
(i) the holder redeposits the check; and
(ii) t h a t check is honored.
(4) If the issuer does not pay the amount owed under
Subsection (2)(b) within 15 calendar days from the day on

189
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which the notice required under Subsection (5) is mailed, the
issuer is liable for:
(a) the amount owed under Subsection (2Kb); and
(b) collection costs not to exceed $20.
(5) (a) A holder shall provide written notice to an issuer
before:
(i) charging collection costs under Subsection (4) in
addition to the amount owed under Subsection (2)(b);
or
(ii) filing an action based upon this section,
(b) The written notice required under Subsection (5)(a)
shall notify the issuer of the dishonored check that:
(i) if the amount owed under Subsection (2)(b) is
not paid within 15 calendar days from the day on
which the notice is mailed, the issuer is liable for:
(A) the amount owed under Subsection (2)(b);
and
(B) collection costs under Subsection (4); and
(ii) the holder may file civil action if the issuer does
not pay to the holder the amount owed under Subsection (4) within 30 calendar days from the day on
which the notice is mailed.
(6) (a) If the issuer has not paid the holder the amounts
owed under Subsection (4) within 30 calendar days from
the day on which the notice required by Subsection (5) is
mailed, the holder may offer to not file civil action under
this section if the issuer pays the holder:
(i) the amount owed under Subsection (2)(b);
(ii) the collection costs under Subsection (4);
(in) an amount that:
(A) is equal to the greater of:
(I) $50; or
(II) triple the check amount; and
(B) does not exceed the check amount plus
$250; and
(iv) if the holder retains an attorney to recover on
the dishonored check, reasonable attorney's fees not
to exceed $50.
(b) (i) Notwithstanding Subsection (6)(a), all amounts
charged or collected under Subsection (6)(a)(iii) shall
be paid to and be the property of t h e original payee of
the check.
(ii) A person who is not t h e original payee may not
retain any amounts charged or collected under Subsection (6)(a)(iii).
(hi) The original payee of a check may not contract
for a person to retain any amounts charged or collected under Subsection (6)(a)(iii).
(7) (a) A civil action may not be filed under this section
unless the issuer fails to pay the amounts owed:
(i) under Subsection (4); and
(ii) within 30 calendar days from the day on which
the notice required by Subsection (5) is mailed.
(b) Subject to Subsection (7)(c) and (d), in a civil action
the issuer of the check is liable to the holder for:
(i) the amount owed under Subsection (2)(b);
(ii) the collection costs under Subsection (4);
(hi) interest;
(iv) court costs;
(v) reasonable attorneys' fees; and
(vi) damages:
(A) equal to the greater of:
(I) $100; or
(II) triple the check amount; and
(B) not to exceed the check amount plus $500.
(c) If an issuer is held liable under Subsection (7)(b),
notwithstanding Subsection (7)(b), a court may waive any
amount owed under Subsections (7)(b)(iii) through (vi)
upon a finding of good cause.
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(d) If a holder of a check violates this section by filing a
civil action under this section before 31 calendar days
from the day on which the notice required by Subsection
(5) is mailed, an issuer may not be held liable for an
amount in excess of the check amount.
(e) (i) Notwithstanding Subsection (7)(b), all amounts
charged or collected under Subsection (7)(b)(vi) shall
be paid to and be the property of the original payee of
the check.
(ii) A person who is not the original payee may not
retain any amounts charged or collected under Subsection (7)(b)(vi).
(iii) The original payee of a check may not contract
for a person to retain any amounts charged or collected under Subsection (7)(b)(vi).
(8) This section may not be construed to prohibit the holder
of the check from seeking relief under any other applicable
statute or cause of action.
(9) (a) Notwithstanding the other provisions of this section,
a holder of a check is exempt from this section if:
(i) the holder:
(A) is a depository institution; or
(B) a person t h a t receives a payment on behalf
of a depository institution;
(ii) the check is a payment on a loan t h a t originated at the depository institution that:
(A) is the holder; or
(B) on behalf of which the holder received the
payment; and
(iii) the loan contract states a specific service
charge for dishonor.
(b) A holder exempt under Subsection (9)(a) may contract with an issuer for the collection of fees or charges for
the dishonor of a check.
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7-15-2. N o t i c e — Form.
(1) (a) "Notice" means notice given to the issuer of a check
either orally or in writing.
(b) Written notice may be given by United States mail
t h a t is:
(i) first class; and
(ii) postage prepaid.
(c) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(b), written notice is
conclusively presumed to have been given when the notice
is:
(i) properly deposited in the United States mail;
(ii) postage prepaid;
(iii) certified or registered mail;
(iv) return receipt requested; and
(v) addressed to the signer at the signer's:
(A) address as it appears on the check; or
(B) last-known address.
(2) Written notice under Subsection 7-15-1(5) shall take
substantially the following form:
Date:
To:
You are hereby notified t h a t the check(s) described below
issued by you has (have) been returned to us unpaid:
Check date:
Check number:
Originating institution:
Amount:
Reason for dishonor (marked on check):
In accordance with Section 7-15-1, Utah Code Annotated,
you are liable for this check together with a service charge of
$20, which must be paid to the undersigned.
If you do not pay the check amount and the $20 service
charge within 15 calendar days from the day on which this
notice was mailed, you are required to pay witliin 30 calendar
days from the day on which this notice is mailed:

